By Konstantinos Anagnostakis, Analyst KEDISA
Since the start of his first term, President Trump consistently criticized Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela for its authoritarianism and narcotics trafficking. At a multilateral UN meeting in New York on September 25, 2019, he declared that ‘’the Western Hemisphere will not be written by socialists and tyrants, but by liberty-loving patriots,’’ labelling Venezuela a ‘’sanctuary for terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime’’ (The White House, 2019). To amplify pressure, the U.S. imposed sweeping oil and financial sanctions, including Executive Orders 13850 and 13884, plus a de facto PDVSA embargo, that froze $7 billion in assets and blocked access to U.S. markets, crippling Venezuela’s economy, which relies on oil for 95% of its revenue (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). On a diplomatic level, Trump supported an international front that refused to recognise the legitimacy of Maduro’s re-election in 2018, qualifying opposition leader Juan Guaidó as interim President (Bartlett & Ophel, 2021). Despite these pressures, the Venezuelan armed forces remained loyal to Maduro via economic privileges and repression, thwarting regime change (Watanabe, 2024).
Against this backdrop, Trump’s second administration renewed its anti-Maduro policies, this time by expanding the U.S. military presence in the Caribbean, to counter narcotics smuggling and trafficking groups. The United States deployed naval vessels, bombers, warships, and Marine units that conducted interdiction operations against boats and ships used for illicit trafficking toward the United States. These actions constituted one of the most volatile U.S. operations in Latin America the past decade (Fox News, 2025). The renewed military buildup in Roosevelt Roads naval base in Puerto Rico, closed since 2004, showcases the scale of this deployment.
The administration simultaneously authorised covert CIA actions, with the first officially acknowledged strike reportedly involving a drone attack on a port facility along Venezuela’s coastline. Diplomatic pressure was also intensified through the closure of Venezuelan airspace (Johansen & Svirnovskiy, 2025) and the interdiction of sanctioned oil tankers entering or departing Venezuela (Johnson, 2025). In addition, several cartels and gangs, such as Tren de Aragua, were designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), with U.S. officials explicitly linking them to the Venezuelan leadership. Beyond these tensions, rhetoric from the White House remained confrontational over subsequent months, threatening the Venezuelan government with either compliance or escalation into open conflict.
But why is Venezuela of such importance to the United States? Is this focus rooted in a principled commitment to democracy and human rights, or does it reflect broader strategic and economic interests?
The United States is the world’s largest oil producer. However, crude oil varies significantly in quality and composition. Using API gravity, which is a measure of how heavy or light a petroleum liquid is relative to water, crude oil is commonly classified as light, medium, or heavy. The majority of U.S. domestic production consists of light crude oil, whereas a substantial share of U.S. imports is composed of heavy crude, which is fully compatible with some of the largest U.S. refineries located south, in Texas and Louisiana (American Petroleum Institute, n.d.). These refineries are primarily configured to process heavier grades of crude oil (Statista, 2025).
Venezuela reportedly holds the world’s largest reserves of extra-heavy crude, particularly in the Orinoco Belt, resources that have been mismanaged and underdeveloped for years. Owing to their geographic proximity (approximately 1,300 miles from Florida) these reserves represent a potentially low-cost and logistically efficient supply, well suited to maximising diesel and gasoline yields. Beyond oil, estimates indicate that Venezuela possesses more than 5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, accounting for roughly 70% of South America’s total reserves (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024). In addition, the country is believed to hold significant deposits of strategic minerals, including gold, coltan, iron ore, and bauxite.
By asserting control over Venezuela’s oil and gas reserves, the United States stands to save billions of dollars annually in energy imports. Since the imposition of U.S. sanctions beginning in 2005, Maduro’s regime has been advancing relations with partners such as China and Russia, with China emerging as Venezuela’s second-largest oil buyer (Naranjo Cáceres & Brincat, 2025). In recent years, Venezuela and China have signed multiple oil and mining agreements, significantly expanding Beijing’s economic and strategic footprint in Latin America. Discussions additionally addressed the potential development of Chinese military bases within the country. As U.S. efforts to exert influence over Venezuela’s energy sector through diplomatic pressure and sanctions failed to yield regime change, the Trump administration escalated its approach toward direct intervention. This shift culminated in Operation Absolute Resolve, during which Maduro and his wife were captured and forcibly transported to the USS Iwo Jima en route to New York by U.S. Delta Forces, marking an unprecedented step in American engagement with the Venezuelan crisis. Maduro was taken into U.S. federal custody to face criminal charges, including narcoterrorism and drug trafficking.
This decision may seem shocking, yet it is hardly surprising. It is consistent with the recently updated U.S. National Security Strategy, which places the Western Hemisphere at the centre of American strategic priorities and asserts a modern version of the Monroe Doctrine to prevent external actors from gaining influence over key assets in the region (The White House, 2025). True to form, the administration turns once again to hard power as its preferred tool to secure these objectives. After all, Trump undertook unilateral executive action without a formal declaration of war from Congress, notwithstanding the Constitution’s assignment of the power to declare war to the legislative branch.
What to expect from now on?
First, the United States is likely to seek a Venezuelan leader compatible with its interests. If Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president, were to assume the presidency, she would be constitutionally required to hold elections within thirty days. In that scenario, opposition leader Edmundo González could again emerge as a strong contender, as he did in 2024. Regime change is also unlikely to reduce U.S. involvement in Venezuela’s internal affairs; if anything, it may increase it. Trump reportedly established a designated team to manage the post-transition period, while U.S. forces are expected to provide security until the governance vacuum is effectively addressed. Managing a stable and orderly transition of power may prove to be the ‘hard part’, particularly as other domestic and international actors may resist these changes and pursue their own agendas. As past cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan show, removing an authoritarian leader is often easier than overseeing a transition to a stable democratic government. What happens next remains uncertain, but the stakes are clear: Venezuela cannot become ‘Libya 2.0’.
References
American Petroleum Institute. (n.d.). The U.S. primarily imports heavy crude oils from Canada and Mexico. https://www.api.org/energy-insights/charts-analysis/us-primarily-imports-heavy-crude-oils
Bartlett, J., & Ophel, M. (2021, June 22). Sanctions by the numbers: Spotlight on Venezuela. Center for a New American Security. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/sanctions-by-the-numbers-3
Fox News. (2025, December 10). Trump administration releases video of the Venezuelan tanker seized by the US [Video]. https://www.foxnews.com/video/6386297216112
Johansen, B., & Svirnovskiy, G. (2025, November 29). Trump orders the closure of Venezuelan airspace. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/11/29/trump-venezuelan-airspace-military-00670743
Johnson, K. (2025, December 17). Trump announces blockade on sanctioned oil tankers to and from Venezuela, further pressuring Maduro. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/17/trump-blockade-venezuela-maduro-oil-tankers-sanctions/
Naranjo Cáceres, J. Z., & Brincat, S. (2025, December 10). Why is Trump so obsessed with Venezuela? His new security strategy provides some clues. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/why-is-trump-so-obsessed-with-venezuela-his-new-security-strategy-provides-some-clues-271530
The White House. (2019, September 25). Remarks by President Trump in a multilateral meeting on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela | New York, NY. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-multilateral-meeting-bolivarian-republic-venezuela-new-york-ny/
The White House. (2025, November). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf ?utm_source=chatgpt.com
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). Venezuela-related sanctions. https://2017-2021.state.gov/venezuela-related-sanctions/
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2024, February 8). Country Analysis Brief: Venezuela. U.S. Department of Energy. eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Venezuela/pdf/venezuela_2024.pdf#page=14.58
Watanabe, K. (2024, October 31). Maduro and the support of the Armed Forces: A civil-military relations perspective. Global Affairs, University of Navarra. https://en.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/maduro-y-el-apoyo-de-las-ffaa-una-perspectiva-desde-las-relaciones-c%C3%ADvico-militares
